


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WEEKLY SUMMARY



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H I G H L I G H T S

The Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which laid down the principles for a modus vivendi in Germany and made substantial progress toward an Austrian treaty, clearly revealed that the Kremlin does not believe eventual Soviet domination of Germany can be achieved through unification of the country at this time. Confronted with the anti-Soviet trend of the May elections in Soviet Zone Germany and mounting signs of nationalism within the Satellites, the Kremlin probably reasons that waiting tactics are best at present (see page 2). Such a course, combined with just enough evidence of give-and-take to insure western willingness to continue the meetings of the CFM, must seem especially attractive at present to the Kremlin because of its probable estimate that a crisis of western capitalism is now approaching much faster than previously anticipated.

Meanwhile, in an effort to counteract "nationalism and deviationism" in the Satellite countries, the USSR has recently pursued more vigorously a campaign to tighten control over Satellite Communist parties, to weaken the hold of the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe, and to undermine the position of Tito in Yugoslavia (see page 4). In the campaign against the Church, the Kremlin has encountered immediate and vigorous resistance from the Vatican, which apparently has abandoned hope of reaching some working understanding with the Communists in the Satellites.

In its intensified drive against Tito, the USSR has apparently advanced from ideological warfare to concrete diplomatic and economic action (see page 7). The visible widening recently of the year-old rift between Tito and the Kremlin has been accompanied by a sharp exchange of diplomatic notes between the USSR and Yugoslavia and, much more fundamental, by a severe tightening of the Soviet-Satellite economic blockade against Yugoslavia.

THE CFM MEETING

The recent meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which made substantial progress on the Austrian treaty and agreed in principle on a modus vivendi for Germany, clearly revealed that the Kremlin does not yet believe that the unification of Germany would contribute to eventual Soviet control over Germany. The Kremlin is not ready to relax its grip on Berlin and east Germany and apparently believes that ultimate Soviet objectives can best be obtained by a slight relaxation in cold war tension and continuation of the partition of Germany.

The failure of Vishinsky to build up a consistent propaganda pattern at Paris, as well as his defensive attitude and apparent improvisation, suggests that some basic change took place in the Soviet attitude not long before the meeting. The rude jolt to the USSR from the May elections in the Soviet Zone Germany and continuing difficulties in maintaining Soviet control over the Satellites may have contributed to the Soviet decision to mark time on the German question. More fundamentally, however, the USSR may have estimated that a western economic recession is now approaching more rapidly than was previously believed and consequently that the future will provide more favorable opportunities for the attainment of Soviet objectives in Germany and Western Europe.

The Kremlin probably reasons that the western powers, particularly the US, will be in a weaker position in the event of a depression to oppose the USSR because: (1) an economy-minded US would be more reluctant to give adequate support to the European recovery program and the Military Aid Program; (2) economic difficulties would weaken US-British-French solidarity; (3) Western Europe would be increasingly reluctant to maintain trade restrictions against Eastern Europe; and (4) economic distress would make western Germany more receptive to Soviet overtures. With this in mind, the USSR apparently felt it necessary to preserve the status quo while making certain that the door remained open for future negotiations through the machinery of the CFM. A more truculent Soviet attitude at Paris might have increased western determination to re-arm and impelled western legislatures to continue their financial support of the "cold war" despite economic troubles at home.

WESTERN EUROPE

GERMANY

Freedom of Opinion The development of democratic legal processes in western Germany may be jeopardized by application under the Bonn Constitution of former German legal codes and the growing tendency of German officials to use the codes in order to muzzle free expression of opinion. For example, during a 15-month period, German officials in Hesse have invoked the old "Insult Law" in 250 cases to prosecute individuals and newspapers for publicly criticizing government officials or actions. Approximately 95% of these cases resulted in convictions, and officials have used the law not only to win court suits against their critics but to gag them by threatening suit. With the termination of the Military Government in July, responsibility for determining the validity of the law throughout western Germany will rest with the new Federal Supreme Court, whose members are likely to prove zealous defenders of bureaucratic privilege.

AUSTRIA

Austrian Elections Although pre-election activity in Austria points to a bitter and hard fight between Austria's two major anti-Communist groups (the People's and Socialist Parties), the campaign will not be allowed to disrupt the coalition government. Although already assured of the support of most of the 500,000 disenfranchised Nazis who will be voting for the first time since the war, conservative People's Party leaders recently conferred "secretly" with prominent ex-Nazi leaders, hoping to reach a definite understanding that would preclude large-scale drifting of ex-Nazis to any new rightist or regional parties that may be formed before the October elections. The Socialists, meanwhile, apparently genuinely afraid that increased Nazi influence in the People's Party would make continuation of the coalition after the elections more difficult, have publicized the "secret conference," also hoping thereby to gain popular support at the expense of their coalition partner. Neither party, however, is likely to take any step that will endanger the regime so long as the USSR is in a position (through continued quadripartite occupation) to exploit any internal crisis.

E A S T E R N E U R O P E

By means of purging "nationalists" in the Satellite Communist parties, a more aggressive campaign against the Catholic Church, and an intensification of its attacks upon Tito, the Kremlin is continuing its attempts to consolidate its position and control in the Satellite countries. The vigor and intensity of Soviet activity in the Satellite area reflects continuing Soviet concern over the ability of the local Communist regimes to serve Soviet interests. Confronted with growing economic recovery in Western Europe in comparison with economic hardship in the Satellites, a still-defiant Yugoslavia, and a more aggressively hostile Catholic Church, the Kremlin has apparently decided to take prompt and drastic steps toward eliminating the last vestiges of opposition in its uneasy Satellites.

Party Purges The vigorous efforts being made in Hungary and Bulgaria to eradicate "nationalist" deviationists indicate that the Kremlin has not yet solved the problem of "home-grown" Communism. In both countries, the ruling group of Moscow adherents is attacking a prominent nationalist Communist leader in order to make an example of him. Former Bulgarian economic czar Traicho Kostov and ex-Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Rajk have already been expelled from the Communist Party. The Hungarian regime now seeks to destroy Rajk totally by levelling at him the sensational charge of espionage for the US, while the propaganda assault on Kostov, in which even the Cominform journal is being utilized, continues unabated. Both Kostov and Rajk had a substantial party following and had risen to power locally without direct Kremlin support. Their destruction will demoralize anti-Moscow Bulgarian and Hungarian Communists and forestall the rise of any

Communists who might consider the national interest before that of the USSR.

Anti-Catholic Drive The Soviet Union's continuing drive against the Catholic Church is currently being focused on Czechoslovakia, where the probable imminent arrest of Archbishop Beran may follow the pattern established in the recent Mindszenty trial in Hungary. (In Poland the Communist Government is preparing cases against certain Catholic bishops for collaboration with the Nazis.) The Czechoslovak Government is publicly accusing Beran of political activity against the state and will probably arrest him soon on trumped-up charges of treason based upon evidence allegedly found in the Archbishop's personal files. Beran's arrest will immobilize the last effective anti-Communist force in Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, Soviet determination to eradicate Catholic power and influence in the Satellites has been matched by the increasingly aggressive anti-Communist stand of the Vatican. Communist plans to establish national or Communist-manipulated churches have apparently caused the Vatican to abandon all hope of achieving a modus vivendi in the Satellites and instead to embark on a vigorous campaign to resist Communist anti-Catholic pressure. In addition to stepping up its radio propaganda designed to stiffen Catholic resistance in the Satellites, the Vatican has already meted out severe penalties of excommunication and suspension to Catholics in Hungary and Czechoslovakia who participate in the anti-Church campaign. In addition, the Church may soon issue a fundamental encyclical warning all Catholics in the Soviet orbit against cooperating with the Communists and appealing to the Christian world for aid and intervention. Despite these Vatican moves, however, the Communists retain a definite advantage in the struggle. Basing their strategy on cutting the ties

binding local Catholic churches with Rome, on separating the Church hierarchy from the parish priests and the people, and on abolishing Catholic control over education, the Communist regimes have the means and determination eventually to destroy all effective Catholic resistance in the Satellites.

Polish Changes In tightening their grip on Poland, the pro-Moscow Communists have continued their slander campaign against the Catholic Church and are grooming Aleksander Zawadski, a faithful Moscow follower, for titular leadership in the Party. Since Gomulka was read out of the Party leadership about a year ago, Zawadski's ascent has been steady and rapid until now he appears to be the Number One prospect to serve as the Party's front man. Service with the Red army and as a political commissar in the Soviet-sponsored Polish Army corps, plus eleven years of political imprisonment, have made Zawadski a convinced and ruthless Communist and a logical Kremlin choice to head the Polish Communist Party and perhaps eventually the Polish Government.

Albanian Weakness The Soviet "penetrationists," who have assumed direct control of the Hoxha administration in Albania, are concentrating their main efforts toward stabilizing the regime on alleviating the nation's transportation difficulties. During 1949, Soviet railway technicians helped open a railroad running between the capitol at Tirana and the principal supply port at Durazzo. Despite the presence and activities of the Soviet representatives in Albania and other Soviet efforts to maintain this weak and distant Satellite outpost, Hoxha remains pessimistic about the future of both himself and his country. His pessimism is based upon: (1) Albania's basic poverty and lack of self-sufficiency; (2) the current hostility of the people toward his pro-Soviet regime; and (3) the isolation of Albania from the rest of the Soviet bloc.

YUGOSLAVIA

Tito-Stalin Rift The year old Tito-Stalin rift has widened perceptibly in the past few weeks. The struggle between Yugoslavia and its former partners to the East has apparently now passed the stage of propaganda exchanges on predominantly ideological themes and entered the realm of concrete diplomatic and economic action. This intensified Soviet effort against Yugoslavia is in part necessary in order to buttress the current Kremlin campaign against "nationalist" deviation in the Satellites. More fundamentally, the Kremlin must feel compelled to take more drastic action against Tito because Tito's continued defiance strikes at the very core of the Stalinist concept of Communist expansion and acts as a strong magnet to other Communists with nationalist leanings.

Pressure on Tito The intensification of the Yugoslav-Soviet struggle has been manifested on several fronts. Sparked by an exchange of sharp diplomatic notes between the USSR and Yugoslavia, the Soviet attack has been carried on by Hungary and Albania and strongly supported by Bulgaria. Hungarian-Yugoslav relations have been severely strained by recurring border incidents, the mutual ouster of diplomatic representatives, and a Yugoslav charge of Hungarian espionage activity. Border incidents have also increased on the Yugoslav-Albanian frontier, and Bulgaria has not only intensified the anti-Yugoslav war of nerves by concentrating troops on the Yugoslav border but has expressed an intention to encourage subversive activities within Yugoslavia. Of more far reaching significance, however, has been the tightening of the economic blockade against Tito. Although such a blockade would deprive the Satellites of vitally needed Yugoslav non-ferrous metals, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have already

YUGOSLAVIA

reportedly broken off all trade relations with Yugoslavia and similar action by the other Satellites may be planned in the near future. In view of Tito's increasing trade relations with the West, the Kremlin may in fact be anticipating a similar action by Yugoslavia.

Ability to Resist Barring an extremely unlikely Soviet decision to overthrow Tito by forceful invasion, the Tito regime will continue to defy the Kremlin and successfully maintain its independence of action at least during 1949. Yugoslav officials are apparently confident of their ability to maintain control in the face of the Soviet-Satellite war of nerves and the more acerbated the conflict becomes, the less likely it is that either Tito or Stalin can find an acceptable basis for the return of Yugoslavia into the Soviet orbit. Even the application by the Soviet orbit of total economic sanctions against Yugoslavia would not result in the collapse of the Yugoslav economy. Tito will undoubtedly be able to survive until substantial imports from the West begin to arrive and any reduction in Yugoslav-Satellite trade would actually place Yugoslavia in a correspondingly more favorable position to fulfill its export commitments to the West.

Relations with Greece Meanwhile, the deterioration in Yugoslav-Cominform relations has improved the prospects for an amicable settlement of outstanding Greek-Yugoslav issues. Yugoslav willingness to reach a settlement may have increased as a result of: (1) the belief that the USSR, as indicated by its failure to support Yugoslav claims against Austria at the CFM meeting, will no longer support Yugoslav foreign policy

YUGOSLAVIA

in other areas; (2) the realization that establishment of trade with the West will be facilitated by the cessation of Yugoslav support for the Greek guerrillas; and (3) a desire to make its own terms with Greece now in the event that the recent Greek guerrilla "peace offensive" by the Cominformists should result in a prior accord. The Greek Government also has strong reasons for reaching a settlement with Yugoslavia. Although such an agreement would not diminish to any marked degree the immediate ability of the guerrillas to continue their fight in Greece, it would: (1) weaken the morale of the Greek guerrillas and bolster the morale of the Greek population; (2) focus the guilt for aid to the Greek Communists primarily on Albania; and (3) accentuate a possible Soviet desire to remove the present struggle in Greece from the military to the political sphere.

F A R E A S T

CHINA

New Government The establishment of a Communist government for all of China moved nearer last week when a standing committee representing "various democratic parties, peoples organizations, minority groups, and overseas Chinese organizations and the Chinese Communist Party" received instructions at Peiping to make plans for convening a Political Consultative Conference and to draft a constitution and formulate "general plans" for the future government of China. It thus appears that the Communist-controlled Political Consultative Conference will adopt a constitution and proclaim a National Government of China without the intermediate step of approval by a National Assembly.

Party Policy Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party is apparently attempting to reconcile its ideological affinity for the USSR with its need for economic relations with the West. The delicacy of the Communist problem became clear last week when the Communist Party: (1) at the Peiping meeting, carefully avoided identifying the US as a warmongering imperialist (which has been the propaganda line during the past three years); and (2) publicly censured a Communist editor for having intimated that the USSR behaves in China like an oppressive, "imperialist" nation. The softening of anti-US propaganda reflects the urgency the Communists attach to the restoration of international trade with western nations. In rebuking the Communist editor, the Chinese Communist Party publicly admitted for the first time that some elements within its ranks are unsatisfied with the role of the USSR in China's affairs.

CHINA

Military Plans On the military front, the Communists are going ahead with their preparations for an offensive and have concentrated eighteen armies in the areas surrounding Nanchang and Wuchang. As soon as these Communist forces are fully prepared, they will probably open their drive on Canton by moving south along the Kan and Hsiang Rivers and then along the East River and the railway into the provisional Nationalist capitol. Canton probably will be taken sometime in August.

Chiang Influence As the Nationalist military situation worsens and political fragmentation continues, Chiang Kai-shek appears to be moving to take over the reins of a virtually bankrupt and discredited government. Recently, a small Kuomintang Emergency Policy Committee was formed, with Chiang Kai-shek as chairman and Li Tsung-jen as vice-chairman, for the purpose of directing the party and the Nationalist Government. The committee membership is made up almost entirely of loyal Chiang supporters who will resist any move by Li to take independent action. Chiang's influence is also being shown in the new Yen Hsi-shan Cabinet which is composed largely of right-wing Nationalists. Although the new Cabinet is weak and faces insuperable obstacles, Chiang has reportedly promised limited financial support in order to maintain the Nationalist Government on the mainland. Meanwhile, the Canton Nationalists appear virtually paralyzed in the face of the Communist threat to the city. Despite a Foreign Office announcement that the Government is preparing to move to Chungking, most Nationalist leaders and government employees in Canton are either fleeing to Chiang's Taiwan or preparing to serve the Communists.

CHINA

Pai's Plans **Pai Chung-hsi**, the commander of the only Nationalist troops in south China capable of fighting the Communists, recently visited Canton reportedly to tell Li that he could not go on unless quickly supplied with money, arms, and ammunition for his troops. Not having received any assurances that the needed supplies would be forthcoming, either from the US or Chiang Kai-shek, Pai will probably complete the withdrawal of his own personal troops into Kwangsi. Cut off from the Generalissimo's Nationalists and militarily isolated from Szechwan, Pai would soon be forced into the role of a purely provincial war lord. Although he would be able to maintain his position for some time, Pai may choose to come to terms with the Communists, who have reportedly sent a representative to Canton to arrange peace terms with the Kwangsi clique.

JAPAN

Labor Disorders Displaying an increasingly aggressive attitude, the Japanese Communist Party has inspired strikes recently among Government railway workers and at a major steel plant over the issue of the "rationalization" of private and Government payrolls expected under the new economic stabilization program. Although the Communists failed to rally any great measure of popular support for these strikes, they may obtain stronger backing for their developing program of labor disorders this autumn because: (1) mass dismissals under the new stabilization program will then have raised the number of unemployed to a new postwar high; and (2) Government relief measures will not yet be sufficiently advanced to deal effectively with the unemployment problem.

GENERAL

WFTU Campaign Communist labor leaders at the Milan Congress of World Federation of Labor Unions (WFTU) will devote major efforts to plans for increasing WFTU influence in the Far East, Southeast Asia, and under-developed and colonial areas. Confronted with the recent decision of eight Middle and Far Eastern labor delegations at the Geneva ILO Congress to form a non-Communist Asian Labor Federation, the WFTU will probably accelerate its organizing drive in this area. Although the absence of Indian and Japanese delegates at Milan will reduce representation from the Far East, the Federation will nevertheless proceed with plans for a Pan-Asiatic Labor Conference in Peiping this fall. On the western labor front, the Congress will probably take steps to combat preparations by the free western trade unions for a new labor international.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Dominican "Invasion" The Caribbean Legion, although unsuccessful in its recent effort to land men and materiel in Luperon Harbor in the Dominican Republic, will continue to pursue its revolutionary objectives in Central America and the Caribbean. Thus far the stability of individual governments in the area has not been affected, but international relationships will inevitably become even more strained. Dominican President Trujillo is expected to lodge accusations with various inter-American groups, using the recent incident as proof of the hostile intentions of Guatemala and Cuba in particular.

ECONOMIC TRENDS IN THE UK

Although the British economy is still near the postwar peak in terms of production, the downward trend in exports, particularly to dollar areas, will, unless checked, lead to an economic crisis. In addition to import restrictions in numerous countries and increasing competition in the world market, the British are confronted with a sharp decline in exports to the US and a consequent increasing drain on British gold and dollar reserves. It may be many months before these reserves fall to the irreducible minimum; however, a financial crisis is possible within the next year.

In an attempt to reverse the trend toward dwindling trade with dollar areas, the UK has organized a high-business-level Dollar Export Board for the purpose of concentrating on exploitation of US and Canadian markets. Although this drive will be aided by recent import restrictions imposed by India and South Africa, the government has had little success in the past in influencing the direction of trade. Moreover, the hard currency markets are the most competitive, and the British must find some means of reducing the prices of most of their goods if they are to expand substantially their exports to these areas.

In its attempt to solve this problem, the UK will first concentrate on efforts to reduce production costs and to cut profit margins. It considers currency devaluation as a last resort. Devaluation would have the immediate advantage of reducing prices in terms of other currencies, but equivalent devaluation by other countries could be expected to restore the old relationships, and there is no assurance that the US would not frustrate the move by raising tariffs. Furthermore, the lower purchasing power of the pound would increase the cost of living at home and create serious new political problems.

Consequently, strenuous efforts will be made to improve industrial efficiency and productivity in order to lower selling costs. The return to prewar competitive conditions will in itself act as a strong incentive to export manufacturers to reduce costs. One of the principal factors in the success of this effort will be the attitude of labor. Thus far, labor has consistently pressed for wage increases and it is still highly questionable whether labor will relax these demands in the interests of national recovery.

THE ARAB REFUGEES

The problem of the 850,000 Palestine Arab refugees will probably remain a major source of friction between Israel and the Arab states at least for the next ten years. The Government of Israel shows no sign of being willing to make a major contribution to a solution of the problem, and the Arab states are economically unable to assume the burden of resettling the refugees within their own borders. Even in the unlikely event that strong pressure impels Israel to repatriate as many as 100,000 refugees, substantial outside aid for a long-range development program will be necessary in order to resettle the remaining Arabs and create economic and political stability in the Middle East.

The great majority of the 1,200,000 Arabs who were in Palestine in May, 1948, are now refugees. Approximately 465,000 refugees are in Arab-held Palestine; 100,000 in those areas of Palestine now under Israeli control; 80,000 in Syria; 85,000 in Jordan; 90,000 in Lebanon; and 5,000 in Iraq.

Regardless of the ultimate disposition of these Arab refugees, their immediate plight is desperate. More than two-thirds have no shelter; food supplies are inadequate; and health and sanitary conditions make the threat of epidemics constant. Temporary relief funds provided by the UN will be exhausted by October.

Despite the immediate urgency of the problem, neither the Israelis nor the Arabs have taken any concrete steps which would lead to even a temporary settlement of the problem. The Arab states refuse to assume responsibility for the refugees until Israel has agreed both to repatriate a substantial number and to provide compensation for property seized from those not repatriated. Israel is unlikely to take such a step toward a settlement of the problem because of: (1) the security risk involved in having a large Arab population inside Israel; and (2) reluctance to stop the flow of Jewish immigrants in order

to make room for Arab repatriates. Continuation of this Israeli-Arab impasse will increase the difficulty of obtaining UN approval for more relief funds by 1 October.

Irrespective of any temporary relief measures, and even if Israel should adopt a more cooperative attitude toward the refugee problem, the bulk of the refugees will have to be settled in the Arab states, principally Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. These states, in addition to being unable to care for the refugees on a subsistence relief basis, are manifestly unable to finance the extensive agricultural and industrial development projects which will be necessary if a substantial portion of the refugees are to find a permanent means of livelihood. Thus, large-scale foreign aid over a ten-year period will be needed for the completion of such projects as the Jordan Valley "TVA," Point Four schemes to increase the amount of arable land in the Tigris-Euphratis Valley, further development of oil deposits, and various irrigation proposals.

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